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Abstract The LLL algorithm, named after its inventors, Lenstra, Lenstra and Lovász, is one
of the most popular lattice reduction algorithms in the literature. In this paper, we propose the
first variant of LLL algorithm that is dedicated for ideal lattices, namely, the iLLL algorithm.
Our iLLL algorithm takes advantage of the fact that within LLL procedures, previously reduced
vectors can be re-used for further reductions. Using this method, we prove that the iLLL is at
least as fast as the LLL algorithm, and it outputs a basis with the same quality. We also provide a
heuristic approach that accelerates the re-use method. As a result, in practice, our algorithm can
be approximately 8 times faster than LLL algorithm for typical scenarios where lattice dimension
is between 100 and 150. When applying our algorithm to the Gentry-Halevi’s fully homomorphic
challenges, we are able to solve the toy challenge within 24 days using a 2.66GHz CPU, while with
the classical LLL algorithm, it takes 32 days. Further, assuming a 4.0GHz CPU, we predict to
reduce the basis in 15.7 years for the small challenges, while previous best prediction was 45 years.
Keywords: Lattice Theory, Lattice Reduction, LLL, Ideal Lattice, Fully Homomorphic Encryption.
MSC Code: 94A60

1 Introduction
A lattice L is a discrete subgroup of Rn . It is usually represented by a set of integer linear
combinations of vectors B = (b1 , . . . , bd ), bi ∈ Rn , d ≤ n. B is a basis of L, if bi -s are linearly
independent, and d is called the dimension of the L. For a given lattice L, there exists an infinite
number of bases for d ≥ 2. Given a ‘bad’ basis (basis with large coefficients), to find a ‘good’ basis
(bases with small coefficients and almost orthogonal) is known as “lattice reduction”.
The concept of an ideal lattice was first introduced by Micciancio in [20]. For any vectors within
the lattice, the cyclic rotation of the vector (over a certain polynomial ring Z[X]/F [X]) is also in the
lattice. Such a lattice enables important applications in modern cryptography such as constructing
an asymptotic efficient digital signature scheme [19] or a fully homomorphic encryption scheme
[9]. In those schemes, the public key is usually a bad basis, and to find a good basis through the
bad basis will break the cryptosystem. The principal ideal lattice is a special ideal lattice that
can be represented by 3 integers α, δ and d, where δ is the determinant of the lattice, α is a root
and d is the dimension. This type of lattice with this kind of representation is usually adopted in
practice, in order to improve the efficiency of the system ([32] and [9]).
This work is supported by ARC Future Fellowship FT0991397.
Centre for Computer and Information Security Research
School of Computer Science & Software Engineering (SCSSE)
University Of Wollongong, Australia
E-mail: {thomaspl, wsusilo, zz920}@uow.edu.au
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The first polynomial time lattice reduction algorithm, known as LLL, was devised by Lenstra,
Lenstra and Lovász [17] in 1982. For an arbitrary basis B = (b1 , . . . , bd ), where all the Euclidean
norms of bi are bounded by 2β , the LLL algorithm is guaranteed to terminate in O(d6 β 3 ) time.
In theory, the LLL algorithm is able to find vectors that are exponential approximations of the
shortest non-zero vectors of the lattice.
The most popular variant of LLL-type reduction algorithms was that of Nguyen and Stehlé
[25]. It was named L2 since its worst case complexity O(d5 β 2 ) was quadratic in β. Within L2 ,
there is a method named FP which makes uses of several heuristics as described in their paper. In
practice, FP is considered as the most efficient implementation so far.
The first fully homomorphic encryption scheme was proposed by Gentry [9, 8, 10], using ideal
lattices. To date, there exist three types of variants: schemes based on ideal lattices [32, 33, 12],
schemes based on integers [34, 6] and schemes based on (ring) learning with errors [4, 14, 3, 13],
among which, Gentry and Halevi’s scheme [12] is one of the most efficient implementations. The
authors also proposed four different challenges for their scheme. To the best of our knowledge, the
best known attack against those challenges was devised by Chen and Nguyen [5, 24].
Our Contribution: In this paper, we propose the first variant of LLL algorithm that is dedicated
to ideal lattices. We obtain the following results:
– In theory, our algorithm shares the same worst-case bit complexity with the LLL algorithm.
But our algorithm is at least as fast the corresponding LLL algorithm.
– On average cases, we reduce the complexity from O((d3 β + d2 β 2 )M(d)) (as in L2 ) to O((d3 β +
dβ 2 )M(d)), where M(d) is the cost of integer multiplication with two d bit integers.
– In practice, our algorithm out-performs all known lattice reduction algorithms in terms of
running time.
– In terms of the quality of the output basis, our algorithm produces an LLL reduced basis.
Furthermore, in a vast majority of cases, our modification will not affect the output of the
corresponding algorithm. With the same input, our iLLL algorithm will output the same result
as the LLL algorithm in most tests.
– This leads us to a new result to the Gentry and Halevi fully homomorphic encryption challenge.
We solve the toy challenge within 24 days, while we estimate to solve the small challenge in
16.7 years.
Paper Organization: In the next section, we will discuss the background for this paper. In Section 3, we present our iLLL algorithm, and prove its correctness. In Section 4, we compare the
complexity of iLLL with the classical LLL algorithm. In Section 5, we extend our technique over
bases other than principal ideal lattice bases. In Section 6, we present the implementation results.
Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.

2 Background
2.1 Lattice Theory
In this subsection, we review some concepts of lattice theory that will be used throughout this
paper. The lattice theory, also known as the geometry of numbers, was introduced by Minkowski
in 1896 [22]. We refer readers to [18, 21] for a more complex account.
Definition 1 (Lattice) A lattice L is a discrete sub-group of Rn , or equivalently the set of all
the integral combinations of d ≤ n linearly independent vectors over R.
L = Zb1 + Zb2 + · · · + Zbd , bi ∈ Rn
B = (b1 , . . . , bd ) is called a basis of L and d is the dimension of L, denoted as dim(L). L is a full
rank lattice if d equals n.
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For a given
plattice L, there exists an infinite number of bases. However, its determinant, denoted
by det(L) = det(B · BT ), is unique, where BT is the transposition of B.
For a lattice L, the i-th successive minima with respect to L, denoted by λi , is the smallest
real number, such that there exist i non-zero linearly independent vectors b1 , b2 , . . . , bi ∈ L with
kb1 k, kb2 k, . . . , kbi k ≤ λi ,
where k · k denotes the Euclidean norm of the corresponding vector. In addition, if the lattice is
random, then the value of i-th minima is estimated by:
r
1
d
λi (L) ∼
(1)
det(L) d .
2πe
We note that the minimas are independent from i.
For any vector v, denote v(x) the polynomial form of v. Let Rot(v, i) be xi v(x) mod f (x). Then
{Rot(v, i)} 1 ≤ i ≤ d forms a rotation basis. For instance, if f (x) = xn +1 and v = (v1 , v2 , . . . , vd ),
then the rotation basis (B) is of the following form:


v1
v2
 −vd v1


B = −vd−1 −vn
 ..
..
 .
.
−v2 −v3


. . . vd
. . . vd−1 

. . . vd−2 

.. 
..
. . 
−v4 . . . v1
v3
v2
v1
..
.

Definition 2 (Ideal Lattice [20]) Let R be a polynomial ring Z[X]/f (x), where f (x) ∈ Z[X]
is a monic irreducible polynomial of degree n. Let v ∈ Zn . The ideal lattice over R with respect
to v, denoted by L(Rot(v, f )) is the set of all integer linear combinations of v and its rotation
vectors.
Note that for ideal lattices, we have n = d for all bases. Since we are dealing with ideal lattices
throughout this paper, we have n = d.
For a principal ideal lattice, its Hermite normal form (HNF) basis (H) is in the following form.
Such a basis can be represented by three integers {α, δ, d}, where δ is the determinant of the lattice,
and α is the root of unity over the ring. From the point of view of cryptography, one sometimes
also uses H0 , which shares a similar property with H. We note that the bit complexity to reduce
those two bases is the same.



0
0

0
,
.. 
.
mod δ 0 0 . . . 0 1

δ
(−α)
(−α)2 mod δ
..
.




H=


(−α)d−1

0 0 ...
1 0 ...
1 ...
.. .. . .
. . .

0
0
0
..
.



δ
−α


H0 =  0
 ..
 .
0


0 ... 0 0
0 . . . 0 0

1 . . . 0 0
.
.. . . .. .. 
. . . .
0 0 . . . −α 1

0
1
−α
..
.

In this paper, we also deal with lattice bases with other special forms, such as cyclic bases
formed by the bottom several rows of H, or ideal lattices where the top several elements on the
diagonal of their HNF bases are not 1. We note that one can still use our technique when the
vectors whose last non-zero element is 1 start to appear. For simplicity, we use principal ideal
lattices to demonstrate our technique in the rest of the paper, and we assume that the principal
ideal lattices are given in the form of HNF bases.
Definition 3 (Hermite factor) Let B = (b1 , . . . , bd ) a basis of L. The Hermite factor with
respect to B is defined as kb1 k 1 .
det(L) d

Note that the Hermite factor indicates the quality of a reduced basis.
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Definition 4 (Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization) Let B = (b1 , . . . , bd ) be a basis of L. The
Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization (GSO) of B is the following basis B∗ = (b∗1 , . . . , b∗d ):
b∗1 = b1 ,
b∗i

= bi −

µi,j =

i−1
X

µi,j b∗j ,

(2 ≤ i ≤ d),

j=1
bi · b∗j
.
b∗j · b∗j

Definition 5 (Gram determinants) Let B = (b1 , . . . , bd ) be a basis of L. Let B∗ = (b∗1 , . . . , b∗d )
be the corresponding GSO. The Gram determinants of B, noted {∆∗1 , . . . , ∆∗d } is defined as:
∆∗i = det(b∗1 , . . . , b∗i ).
Qd−1
The product of all Gram determinants is defined as: D = i=1 ∆∗i . For any basis, D is upperbounded by 2βd(d−1) , while for the HNF bases of principal ideal lattices, D is further bounded by
2β(d−1) .
2.2 The LLL Algorithm
In this subsection, we give a general overview of the LLL algorithm. We refer the reader to the
book by Nguyen and Vallée [27] for a more complex account.
The LLL algorithm is described in Alg. 1 and 2. Alg. 1 is for size reduction, and it is sometimes
referred to as the Gram-Schmidt reduction. Alg. 2 outputs a (δ, η)-reduced basis. The basis is also
referred to as the LLL-reduced basis.
Definition 6 (η-size reduced) Let B = (b1 , . . . , bd ) be a basis of L. B is η-size reduced, if
|µi,j | ≤ η for 1 ≤ j < i ≤ d. η ≥ 0.5 is the reduction parameter.
Definition 7 ((δ, η)-reduced basis) Let B = (b1 , . . . , bd ) be a basis of L. B is (δ, η)-reduced,
if the basis is η-size reduced and it satisfies Lovász condition as follows: δkb∗i−1 k2 ≤ kb∗i k2 +
√
µ2i,i−1 kb∗i−1 k2 for 2 ≤ i ≤ d. 14 < δ ≤ 1 and 12 ≤ η < δ are two reduction parameters.
It is quite straightforward to see that if Alg. 2 terminates, then its output basis satisfies the
Lovász condition. Hence, the basis is (δ, η)-reduced. Note that in the classical LLL, η = 0.5, while
in L2 (see next subsection), it is essential that η is slightly greater than 0.5.
With regard to the running time of the algorithm, it has been shown that the loop invariant D
is unchanged except during the exchange procedure, while during the exchange, D is decreased by
a factor of δ. Hence, the total number of exchanges is upper bounded by βd(d−1)
log δ , which implies
2

there are maximum O(d2 β) loop iterations. In addition, since the size reduction algorithm requires
O(d2 ) operations, the total number of operations is O(d4 β). Finally, each operation involves integer multiplications with a cost of M(dβ) due to rational arithmetics.1 Hence, the original LLL
algorithm terminates in polynomial time O(d6 β 3 ).
With regard to the quality of a reduced basis for an arbitrary lattice, the following theorem
provides an upper bound.
Theorem 1 For a lattice L, if (b1 , . . . , bn ) form an LLL-reduced basis of L, then,

 d−1
2
1
λi (L).
∀i, kbi k ≤
δ − η2

(2)

1

Hence, if B = (b1 , . . . , bd ) forms an (δ, η)-reduced basis, then kbi k ≤ 2d det(L) d for 1 ≤ i ≤ d.
1 In this paper, we follow the LLL algorithm by using M(d) to be O(d2 ) assuming a naive integer multiplication,
although one can replace it with O(d1+ε ) to obtain the exact bit complexity using fast integer arithmetics as
indicated in Table 1.
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Algorithm 1 Size Reduction
Input: B = (b1 , b2 , . . . , bd ), its GSO, an index κ and a reduction parameter η.
Output: A new basis B, where bκ is size reduced, and the updated GSO.
for i = (κ − 1) → 1 do
if µ ≤ η then
bκ ← bκ − dµκ,i c · bi ;
Update GSO;
end if
end for
return B.

Algorithm 2 LLL
Input: B = (b1 , b2 , . . . , bd ) and reduction parameters (δ, η).
Output: A (δ, η)-reduced basis B.
Compute GSO;
κ ← 2;
while κ ≤ d do
size reduce (B, κ, η);
if δkb∗κ−1 k2 ≤ kb∗κ k2 + µ2κ,κ−1 kb∗κ−1 k2 (Lovász condition) then
κ ← κ + 1;
else
Exchange bκ and bκ−1 ;
κ ← max(κ − 1, 2);
Update GSO;
end if
end while
return B.

2.3 LLL Variants
In this subsection, we list some of the LLL-type algorithms that improve complexity with regard
to β. For other improvements with respect to d, we refer readers to [23, 30, 16].
In 2005, Nguyen and Stehlé [25] proposed an improvement to the LLL, which is the first variant
whose worst-case time complexity is quadratic with respect to β. This algorithm is therefore named
L2 . We briefly recall the difference between L2 and classical LLL. L2 uses floating point arithmetics
where the multiplication can be carried out with precision O(d). Hence, it reduces the cost of integer
multiplication from M(dβ) to M(d). However, to assure correctness of the floating point, the L2
uses a ‘lazy’ size reduction algorithm which incurs a cost of O(d2 + dβ), compared to O(d2 ) as in
LLL. Finally, both algorithms use maximum O(d2 β) loop iterations. Therefore, it terminates with
a worst-case time complexity of O(d5 β 2 + d6 β) for any basis with naive multiplication.
As for a principal ideal lattice basis, it is proved that L2 terminates in O(d4 β 2 + d5 β), since
there are O(dβ) loop iterations for these bases instead of O(d2 β) for bases of random lattices (see
Remark 3, [25]).
The FP is the fastest variant of L2 in practice. It uses some heuristics, such as multi-levels
of floating-point precisions. The classical L2 uses a fixed precision l = O(d), while FP will try
some small precisions (for instance, C int length, which allows fast computation) first, before it
finally uses l. This procedure with small precision is called “early reduction”. Since the complexity
depends largely on the precision, the early reductions are in general very fast. Meanwhile, they
produce a basis that is already reduced to some extent. So the cost of final reduction with precision
= l is greatly reduced.
In [35], van Hoeij and Novocin proposed a gradual sub-lattice reduction algorithm based on
LLL that deals with knapsack-type bases. Unlike other LLL-type reduction algorithms, it only
produces a basis of a sub-lattice. This algorithm uses a worst-case O(d7 + d3 β 2 ) time complexity.
In 2011, Novocin, Stehlé and Villard [28] proposed a new improved LLL-type algorithm that is
quasi-linear in β. This led to the name L̃1 . It is guaranteed to terminate in time O(d6 β + dω+2 β 2 )
for any basis, where ω is a valid exponent from matrix multiplications. To bound ω, we have
2 < ω ≤ 3. A typical setting in [28] is ω = 2.3.
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In [29], Plantard, Susilo and Zhang proposed a recursive reduction that can be applied to
ideal lattice. Their algorithm is proved to finish in O(d3 β 2 + d5 β) for principal ideal lattice bases.
However, we note that this work assumes a uniform distribution, hence, did not provided a worstcase complexity.
In this paper, we compare our algorithm primarily with L2 and its fastest implementation, FP,
since those two are the best in theory and in practice.

2.4 Fully Homomorphic Encryption Challenges
In the fully homomorphic encryption challenges [11], the authors published four sets of public keys
with respect to different parameters (toy, small, medium and large). To solve the challenge, one
needs to recover some short vectors from the public keys. In toy, small and medium challenges,
this can be achieved by performing an LLL reduction over the principal ideal lattice bases. Since
in those lattices, the corresponding Hermite factor is much greater than the upper bound of the
LLL algorithm. Therefore, performing an LLL reduction will solve the challenge. As a result, the
remaining problem is the running time of the LLL algorithm. The previous best results/prediction
for the running time of LLL can be found in Table 2.

3 LLL for Ideal Lattices
Ideal lattice maintains this special property: if a vector v ∈ L, then all its rotation vectors over R
exist in this lattice as well. This useful property can accelerate the reduction. The LLL algorithm
uses a stepping method. At the κ-th step, the first κ vectors in the basis are involved. For a certain
step κ, the top κ − 1 vectors are (δ, η)-reduced. So it will first size-reduce bκ with (b01 , . . . , b0κ−1 ),
where (b01 , . . . , b0κ−1 ) denotes the reduced basis of (b1 , . . . , bκ−1 ), and then perform the LLL
reduction on the whole κ vectors.
However, instead of size-reducing the input vector bκ whose bit-length is in β, one can use a
rotation of a previous vector, providing that this new vector, denoted as v, together with {bi },
1 ≤ i ≤ d, i 6= κ also form a basis of L. This technique is named “re-use”.
Recall that in the κ − 1 step, one has already performed a size reduction on bκ−1 with
(b01 , . . . , b0κ−2 ). Denote v0 the reduced vector. Then one can simply shift v0 to the right to obtain
v. (b01 , . . . , b0κ−1 , v) also form a basis of L(b1 , . . . , bκ ). Moreover, since v is already size-reduced
to some extent, it will often be shorter than bκ , and as a result, re-use will often accelerate the
reduction.
To use the re-use technique recursively, we obtain iLLL algorithm. In the following, we first
show our iLLL algorithm. Then we prove that the algorithm is correct.

3.1 The Algorithm
The iLLL algorithm is described in Alg. 3. We note that the only difference between Alg. 3 and
the LLL algorithm is the re-use technique. In Alg. 3, κ indicates the current vector that iLLL is
working on. κ1 indicates if the current size-reduced vector should be re-used later.
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Algorithm 3 The iLLL Algorithm
Input: The HNF basis B = (b1 , b2 , . . . , bd ) of an ideal lattice and reduction parameters (δ, η)
Output: An (δ, η)-reduced basis B.
Compute GSO.
κ ← 2, κ1 ← 2.
while κ ≤ d do
Size reduce (B, κ, η);
if κ = κ1 and κ < d then
v ← Right shift (bκ );
if kvk < kbκ+1 k then
bκ+1 ← v
end if
κ1 ← κ1 + 1;
end if
if δkb∗κ−1 k2 ≤ kb∗κ k2 + µ2κ,κ−1 kb∗κ−1 k2 then
κ ← κ + 1;
else
Exchange bκ and bκ−1 ;
κ ← max(κ − 1, 2);
Update GSO;
end if
end while
return B.

3.2 Correctness
To start with, for each step, we have the following Lemma:
Lemma 1 Let B = (b1 , . . . , bd ). Let Bi−1 = (b01 , . . . , b0i−1 ) where (b01 , . . . , b0i−1 ) forms a (δ, η)reduced basis of L(b1 , . . . , bi−1 ). Let v ∈ L where the i-th coefficient of v is 1. Then B0 =
(b01 , . . . , b0i−1 , v, bi+1 , . . . , bd ) form a basis of L(B).
Proof Firstly, all row vectors of B0 can be obtained by linear operations of row vectors of B.
Meanwhile, all row vectors of B0 are linearly independent. b01 , . . . , b0i−1 , bi+1 , . . . , bd are linear
independent since the top i − 1 vectors are LLL reduced form b1 , . . . , bi−1 . Also, v is independent
with b01 , . . . , b0i−1 , bi+1 , . . . , bd since the i-th element of all row vectors of B0 is 0 except for v.
Hence, B0 is a basis of L(B).

Then we prove the correctness in Theorem 2.
Theorem 2 For an input basis B, our iLLL algorithm outputs an LLL-reduced basis of L(B).
Proof For the quality of the basis, it is quite straightforward that our algorithm produces an LLLreduced basis, since it checks Lovász condition at the last iteration. Furthermore, we have shown
that our algorithm produces a basis that spans the same lattice as the input basis in Lemma 1,
since the shifted vector is the only one whose (κ + 1)-th coefficient is non-zero. Hence, our iLLL
algorithm outputs an LLL-reduced basis of L(B).

4 Analysis
Our algorithm shares the same worst-case complexity with the LLL algorithm, however, we show
that our algorithm is in theory always faster than LLL algorithm. Further, on average cases, we
obtain a complexity of O(d5 β + d3 β 2 ).
4.1 Comparison with LLL and Worst-case Complexity
Recall that the LLL algorithm uses a stepping method. For the κ-th step (κ > 2), the basis is of
the following form:
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Bκ,LLL

x1,1
x2,1
..
.






xκ−1,1

=
 xκ,1
 Xκ+1

 Xκ+2

 .
 ..
Xd

x1,2 . . . x1,κ
x2,2 . . . x2,κ
..
..
.
···
.
xκ−1,2 . . . xκ−1,κ
xκ,2 . . . xκ,κ
0 ...
0
0 ...
0
..
..
.
···
.
0 ...
0

0 0 ...
0 0 ...
..
. 0 ···
0 0 ...
0 0 ...
1 0 ...
0 1 ...
.. ..
. . ···
0 0 ...


0
0

.. 
.

0

0

0

0

.. 
.
1

where the top κ vectors are LLL-reduced. Then, for the next step, since the top κ vectors are
already reduced, there will be no exchange initially. The LLL will directly size-reduce bκ+1 , and
then operate on (b1 , . . . , bκ+1 ).


x1,1 x1,2 . . . x1,κ 0 0 . . . 0
 x2,1 x2,2 . . . x2,κ 0 0 . . . 0


 ..
..
..
.. ..
.. 
 .
.
···
.
. . · · · .


xκ−1,1 xκ−1,2 . . . xκ−1,κ 0 0 . . . 0



Bκ,iLLL = 
 xκ,1 xκ,2 . . . xκ,κ 0 0 . . . 0
 0
v1 . . . vκ−1 1 0 . . . 0


 Xκ+2
0 ...
0 0 1 . . . 0


 .
..
..
.. ..
.
 ..
.
···
.
. . · · · .. 
Xd

0

...

0

0 0 ... 1

By comparison, the only change we have made is to replace bκ+1 with v as shown in Bκ,iLLL .
This modification indeed accelerates the size-reduction, since v is in general significantly shorter
than bκ+1 . Moreover, since our algorithm does not work on large coefficients (i.e. Xκ+1 ), it requires
less precision of floating-point to size-reduce.
To sum up, in theory, we proved that the iLLL will always be faster than the LLL algorithm
due to the fact that v is not longer than bκ+1 . However, in worst cases, it is possible that kvk ∼
kbκ+1 k if all κ vectors are not well reduced. In this case, our algorithm shares the same worst-case
complexity as the LLL algorithm. It is also worth pointing out that we can never be more costly
than LLL, since if kvk > kbκ+1 k, one simply does not adopt the re-use, and we obtain an exact
LLL algorithm.

4.2 Average-case Complexity
Now we analyze the average case complexity of our algorithm. We assume a uniform distribution
of α over (0, δ), then the lattice is, therefore, a random ideal lattice as in [15]. If a lattice is
random, then its minima λi follow Equation 1. We also assume that random ideal lattices share
same properties with (normal) random lattices in terms of the minimas. Hence, the Equation 1
will hold for our case under this assumption.
For the κ-th step (κ > 2), the basis our algorithm is shown as in the last subsection, where
β
β
κ−1
κ−2
kbi k ∼ 2 2 2 κ−1 for i < κ and kbκ k ∼ 2 2 2 κ−2 . The loop invariant for current step Dκ is then
β
Qκ
2
bounded by i=1 kbi k2(κ−i+1) = 2κ(κ−1) −1 22βκ+ (κ−1)(κ−2) . When the κ-th step terminates, bi
β
κ
will be reduced to 2 2 2 κ for i ≤ κ. Hence, one obtains O(β) loop iterations on average cases for
each step. We note that this observation is quite natural, since there are O(dβ) loop iterations in
total, hence, on average there are O(β) loop iterations for each κ.
1. For the κ-th step, the κ-th step terminated in O(β(κ2 + β)M(κ)) operations:
(a) There are maximum O(β) loop iterations.
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Algorithms
LLL[17]
LLL for ideal lattice
L2 [25]
2
L for ideal lattice[25]
L̃1 [28]
2
Rec-L [29] (average case)
iLLL (average case)

9
Time Complexity
O(d5+ε β 2+ε )
O(d4+ε β 2+ε )
O(d4+ε β 2 + d5+ε β)
O(d3+ε β 2 + d4+ε β)
O(dω+1+ε β 1+ε + d5+ε β)
O(d2+ε β 2 + d4+ε β)
O(d2+ε β 2 + d4+ε β)

Table 1: Comparison of time complexity

β
) iterations within the size reduction.
(b) For each loop iteration, there is maximum O(1+ κ(κ−1)
2
(c) In each size reduction, there are O(κ ) arithmetic operations.
(d) The cost of arithmetic operations is determined by integer multiplications with bit length
O(κ).
Pd
2. Assuming a naive integer multiplication, one obtains O( κ=2 (βκ4 + β 2 κ2 )) = O(d5 β + d3 β 2 ).

Table 1 shows a comparison of time complexity between iLLL and some of LLL-type algorithms
using fast multiplications.

5 Extensions
5.1 Heuristics
The main improvement in our provable algorithm is to replace bκ+1 with a vector from previous
reductions through the size reduction algorithm. In fact, any vector in the lattice can be used as
the replacement, as long as the last non-zero element of this vector is 1. The remaining issue is to
find v more efficiently than size-reduce bκ+1 with (b1 , . . . bκ ). Alg. 4 describes a probabilistic yet
very efficient method to find v.

Algorithm 4 Heuristic Re-use
Input: (b1 , b2 , . . . , bκ ) a (δ, η)-reduced basis
Output: v that can be used for the κ + 1 step of iLLL.
if The last non-zero coefficient of b1 = 1 then
Shift b1 such that the last coefficient is 1.
v ← b1
else
for i = 1 → κ do
Shift bi such that the last coefficient is non-zero.
end for
v ← zero vector
for i = 1 → κ do
for j = i + 1 → κ do
Find x, y and z such that x = ybi,κ + zbj,κ {The XGCD algorithm.}
if x = 1 then
v0 ← ybi + zbj .
if v 6= 0 and kvk ≥ kv0 k then
v ← v0
end if
end if
end for
end for
end if
return v.
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This algorithm first checks if we can directly use the first vector from the previous step with
simple shifting. It requires the last non-zero element of b1 to be 1. The successful rate is high
when β is small and κ is big.
If it fails, then it checks if one can construct a vector by linear combination of two vectors.
This can be done using the extended GCD algorithm. In the re-use technique, it finds all possible
vectors where the last non-zero coefficient is 1, and return the shortest one.
This procedure takes O(κ2 M(β)) on worst-cases reductions and O(κ2 M(β/κ)) on average case
reductions. We note it is negligible in terms of time complexity, compared with the cost of each
iteration. In practice, it can be done in less than 1 second for dimensions as large as 500. Hence, it
finds a vector much faster than using size-reduction algorithm. However, we note that if one uses
this optimization, when the first vector does not qualify, it is possible that the returned vector
will be slightly longer than the one from size-reduction. Hence, it will make the next step a bit
more costly. We also note that this technique is heuristic, since sometimes it is possible that one
cannot find a suitable vector. Nonetheless, our practical tests show that this method is in general
faster than iLLL.

5.2 Re-usable Basis
In fact, our algorithm can also deal with bases other than principal ideal bases. For instance,
general ideal lattices or Coppersmith-Shamir bases, which are used to attack the NTRU encryption
scheme.
It is true that for some ideal lattice HNF bases, the diagonal coefficients do not follow the same
form as a principal ideal lattice. The first several coefficients on the diagonal are not 1. We can
adopt our technique when 1 starts to appear. This should appear very soon, since the diagonal
coefficients are decreasing rapidly to 1 with the increase in dimension.


BCS

q
0
..
.






 0
=
 h0

hN −1

 .
 ..
h1

0 ... 0
q ... 0
..
..
. ···
.
0 ... q
h1 . . . hN −1
h0 . . . hN −2
..
..
. ···
.
h2 . . . h0


0 ... 0
0 . . . 0

..
.. 
. · · · .

0 0 . . . 0

1 0 . . . 0

0 1 . . . 0

.. ..
.. 
. . · · · .
0 0 ... 1

0
0
..
.

The Coppersmith-Shamir basis are of the above form. It is not a principal ideal lattice basis,
however, its bottom part does allow one to apply our re-use technique, since the right non-zero
coefficient is 1 and the left part of the basis is a rotated basis.
To this end, we formally define a reusable basis as a basis where our re-use technique can be
applied.
Definition 8 (i-Reusable Basis) B = (b1 , . . . , bd ) be a basis of L. Let i < d an integer. B is a
reusable basis if ∀κ > i, there exist vectors v, v0 ∈ Zn and a permutation matrix P ∈ Zn×n with
regard to the following:
– v = v0 P;
– v0 is a linear combination of (b1 , . . . , bκ−1 )
– L(b1 , . . . , bκ−1 , v) = L(b1 , . . . , bκ ).
It is quite straightforward to see that all ideal lattice HNF bases are reusable by simple shifting,
while the Coppersmith-Shamir basis is an n-reusable basis with certain permutation. Hence, our
iLLL is also applicable to these bases.
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Fig. 1: Testing results: β = 10d

6 Implementation Result and Practice Analysis
In this section, we show some implementation results. The implementation was conducted with
MAGMA [2] on Xeon E5640 CPUs @ 2.66GHz. The memory was always sufficient since the
algorithm only requires a polynomial space. We first show the average behavior of our algorithm
by comparing us with L2 and FP on bases of random ideal lattice. Subsequently, we apply iLLL
to Gentry-Halevi’s fully homomorphic encryption challenge, and present the results. Finally we
summarize our advantage in practice.

6.1 Test Results
We tested our algorithm with bases of random ideal lattice over three scenarios: β ∼ 10d, β ∼ 20d
and β ∼ 380d. The first scenario for β ∼ 10d is the classical setting for the SVP challenges [1], and
the last one β ∼ 380d is the requirement for Gentry-Halevi’s fully homomorphic encryption scheme.
For comparison, we also tested β ∼ 20d to observe the difference. To ensure the randomness of
the ideal lattice, we require α to be a uniform distribution between 1 and γ.
For each dimension of each test, we generated 10 bases with 10 different seeds. Then we present
the average time to reduce the bases using both L2 and FP methods.
Fig. 1, 2 and 3 show the advantage for each scenario. The ratio is computed from the running
time of LLL divide by the running time of iLLL. As observed, the curves are always above one,
which implies that iLLL is always faster than the counterpart. We observe a small advantage for
L2 as we expected, and the advantage is stable for all three scenarios, while it grows with the
increase of β/d. With β ∼ 380d, iLLL is 20% faster. The time difference in these cases is due to
the re-use technique. In another words, our improvement is due to the unnecessary size reduction
in LLL. As the increase of β/d, the length of the reusable vector increases, which results in an
increasing advantage.
As for the FP method, apart from the starting point and dimension between 100 to 150, iLLL
can be approximately twice faster than LLL. When 100 < d < 150, we enjoy a massive advantage.
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We do not present the result for β ∼ 380d in those dimensions, instead we refer the reader to Fig.
7, which is essentially using the same setting. In some cases, when d ∼ 150 and β ∼ 10d, iLLL can
be as much as 8 times faster than LLL. This is due to the floating-point setting in FP. We shall
discuss this in Subsection 6.3.
Interestingly, for small dimensions d < 80, iLLL and LLL always produce the same basis in
these tests,, while as the dimension grows, some differences may appear. Nevertheless, in most cases
(> 90%), the same basis is produced. We note that this phenomenon is quite natural, since for a
certain step, if we assume the size-reduced vector is indeed a random vector, then two algorithms

2  (d−1)d

2
η−0.5
. This probability is obtained
will produce same result with a probability of 1 − 2
η
as follows:
– Let (b1 , . . . , bκ−1 , bκ ) and (b1 , . . . , bκ−1 , b0κ ) be two (δ, η)-reduced bases of the same lattice
L, where (b1 , . . . , bκ−1 ) are also reduced under the same parameters.
Pκ−1
Pκ−1
– Let v ← bd − i=1 bµi,κ e · bi,κ and v0 ← b0κ − i=1 bµ0i,κ e · bi,κ , where µi,κ and µ0i,κ are GSO
for the respective basis.
– Since both basis are (δ, η)-reduced, we have kµi,κ k ≤ η and kµ0i,κ k ≤ η. Hence, if bκ and b0κ
2

are random vectors, the probability of kµi,κ + µ0i,κ k < 1 for a single pair is 1 − 2 η−0.5
.
η
– We need the condition holds for κ − 1 pairs, therefore, if bκ and b0κ are random vectors, then,


2 κ−1
bκ = b0κ with a probability of 1 − 2 η−0.5
.
η
– If the above result holds for each step, then one obtains
Pd


1−2

η − 0.5
η

2 !

i=2

i−1


=

1−2

η − 0.5
η

2 ! (d−1)d
2
.

Remark 1 In practice, we observe that in most cases our algorithm returns the same basis as LLL.
We believe that this is due to the fact that the reduced vectors in an LLL procedure are very close
to random vectors. Hence, since η = 0.501 by default in MAGMA [2] we achieve a high rate, i.e.,
for a lattice with dimension 200, we obtain the same basis in over > 85% of the tests. We also
note that for some extreme cases, where the reduced vector has some special distribution, this
observation may not be valid.

6.2 Challenge Results
We tested iLLL on the Gentry-Halevi’s fully homomorphic encryption challenge for dimension 512
and dimension 2048. For the dimension 512, the lattice basis was obtained from the challenge
website [11]. For the dimension 2048, we generated the basis as per Gentry-Halevi’s paper [12],
since the basis was not available from the website. Fig. 4 and 5 show the result for dimension 512
and dimension 2048, respectively. We also include the test results for our heuristic method, which
accelerates the reduction a bit further.
As observed from Fig. 4, iLLL is faster than LLL in practice for the small challenges. The
classical FP finishes in 32 days. In comparison, with iLLL we are able to finish within 28 days.
In addition, our heuristics accelerate a bit further to 24 days. Overall, we are around 33% faster
than the classical FP algorithm.
As for the 2048 challenge, within 6 months, we are able to reach dimension 559 and 560 for iLLL
and its heuristics, respectively, while LLL reaches dimension 512. Furthermore, as the dimension
grows, the gap between the running time of iLLL and LLL grows as well, which indicates the time
that iLLL gains is increasing as the dimension grows. Nevertheless, we anticipate to accelerate the
reduction by 30%, which is the same case with the toy challenge. However, due to the fact that
the size reduction of a single vector becomes less important as the dimension grows, compared
with the whole cost of a single step, the actual ratio of advantage is diminishing.
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Fig. 7 shows a comparison of the running time of iLLL and LLL algorithms. The green curve
shows the ratio between the total running time of LLL and iLLL up to a certain dimension, while
the blue curve shows LLL vs iLLL for each dimension. Since the curves is always higher than 1, it
is straightforward to see that iLLL is always faster than LLL. It is also worth pointing out that
at dimension around 100, iLLL can be 10 times faster than LLL.

6.3 Analysis
In the previous subsection, we have seen that the iLLL algorithm is faster than the LLL algorithm
in practice. If we look at each step (Fig. 8 shows one example of this), one can see that in each
step, iLLL is faster. This is due to the fact that instead of reducing a vector of the length β at the
κ-th step, we can use a vector of length β/κ by simply re-using the previous results. The result
follows our theoretical analysis. As stated before, although the time we are able to gain continues
to increase, the advantage is actually diminishing as the dimension grows. This is because the cost
of size-reducing the large vector is less and less important compare to the cost of reducing the
whole basis as the dimension grows.
Interestingly, we enjoy a massive advantage when the dimension is less than 150. Similar
phenomenon is also observed in the tests with random lattices. This is mainly due to the implementation of L2 . In theory, L2 uses a floating point precision p which is in function of d. However,
in practice, FP uses several levels of precisions. It starts with the smallest precision, 53, which
is with respect to C programming language of type double/int in the program. It then increases
the precision to the minimum value of p and the precision for the next stage. This procedure will
be continued until it reaches p. Since the cost relies heavily on the length of floating-points, this
optimization guarantees that the reduction is generally performed with the lowest cost.
It must be noted, however, that since the coefficients of the basis for each new step is large, FP
will need to use a large precision to provide provable reductions. As a comparison, since we are
dealing with small coefficients on average cases, when the dimension is smaller, we only require a
default precision of 53. This is the reason our algorithm is faster in the beginning.
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Gentry-Halevi’s Challenge
Previous Best Results/Prediction[5]
LLL implementation @2.66GHz
iLLL implementation @2.66GHz
iLLL prediction @4.0GHz

dim 512
30 days
32 days
24 days
16 days

dim 2048
45 years
25.8 years
23.6 years
15.7 years

Table 2: Practical Result on Gentry Halevi’s Challenge

6.4 New Estimation
In this subsection, we show our new estimation for the small challenge of Gentry-Halevi’s fully
homomorphic encryption. We start with predicting L2 as in Fig. 9. We predict that the curve
2.8
2.95
follows d 65 + 5d13 , which indicates that L2 will finish in 229.6 seconds which equals to 25.8 years.
We note that this estimation is quite natural, since the previous research [7, 26] has shown that
LLL runs in cubic with regard to d when d is big and β ∼ O(d2 ).
Then we look at the time difference between iLLL and LLL as shown by the third curve in Fig.
8. The result implies that the time we are able to gain with re-use is linear in dimension, when
the curve becomes stable after dimension 130. This indicates that the accumulated time contains
a quadratic term. Now we predict the running time of iLLL. We use the heuristic method, since
2.95
2.8
2
29.47
in general it is faster. We predict that the curve follows d 65 + 5d13 − 77d
5 . This gives us 2
seconds, which equals to 23.6 years. To conclude, we summarize our results in Table 2.
Remark 2 The previous best prediction [5] was using L2 . We note that it is not specified in [5]
what kind of a platform (CPU, library, etc.) their test was conducted on. Therefore, we performed
the same LLL reduction as in [5]. We believe the difference between [5] and our approach is due to
the implementation. This is the reason why we have compared our own LLL/iLLL implementation
against the Gentry-Halevi’s challenge.
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7 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented the iLLL algorithm for ideal lattice. We take the advantage of ideal
lattices that if a vector is in the lattice, then its rotation vector over the ring is still in the
lattice. Therefore, previously reduced vectors can be re-used for further reduction. This ensures
our iLLL algorithm is always faster than the LLL algorithm, while providing the same quality (if
not exactly same) basis. In practice, it is also faster, especially when the coefficients of the lattice
are significantly larger than the dimension. To show the advantage of our method, we applied
our algorithm to Gentry-Halevi’s fully homomorphic encryption challenge. We obtained a better
estimation than the previously best known results.
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